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Abstract. We consider inﬁnite horizon economies with incomplete ﬁnancial markets. Securities
are in positive net supply and may be inﬁnite-lived. We establish existence of equilibria by
requiring borrowing constrains instead of portfolio restrictions.
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1. Introduction
Ponzi schemes need to be avoided to obtain existence of equilibria in inﬁnite horizon incomplete
markets. Thus, debt constraints or transversality conditions have been required to assure that agents
do not postpone, ad inﬁnitum, the payments of their commitments. Within this context, Magill and
Quinzii (1994) and Levine and Zame (1996) show that equilibrium exists when ﬁnancial markets are
composed by short-lived numeraire or nominal assets. Also, Hernandez and Santos (1996) prove the
existence of equilibrium when only one inﬁnite-lived real asset, in positive net supply, is available
for trade.
Since conventional debt constraints bound the portfolio market value, agents can have more access
to credit in any asset just by increasing their investment in the other securities. Thus, it becomes
diﬃcult to bound the amount of borrowing. As a consequence, when assets live for more than one
period, ﬁnite horizon economies, that are obtained by truncating the inﬁnite horizon economy in
order to prove equilibrium existence, may not have equilibrium. For this reason, when long-lived
or inﬁnite lived assets are available, equilibrium existence has been guaranteed at most generically
(see, for instance, Magill and Quinzii (1996) and Hernandez and Santos (1996)).
The aim of this paper is to show the existence of equilibrium in a market where inﬁnite-lived
assets can be traded. To prevent Ponzi schemes, the amount of borrowing that each agent is able
to get becomes dependent on the market value of her physical endowments.
We follow the classical approach that ﬁnds an equilibrium as a limit of equilibria corresponding to
a sequence of ﬁnite horizon economies. As a ﬁrst step, we show a result of equilibrium existence for
truncated economies by deﬁning associated generalized games and showing that equilibrium asset
prices are uniformly bounded. Note that, a positive lower bound for asset prices leads to short-
sales constraints induced by borrowing restrictions. Moreover, as the amounts of borrowing will be
bounded by the market value of commodity a bundle, an upper bound for the asset prices leads
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to a natural restriction on the set of prices that is selected in the generalized game. Thus, we can
guarantee the non-emptiness of the interior of the budget constraint correspondences.
In a second step, we check the asymptotic properties of individual debt, namely, transversality
conditions, which are actually obtained as a consequence of the structure of restrictions on borrowing.
Indeed, since under Kuhn-Tucker multipliers the discounted value of individual wealth will be ﬁnite,
borrowing constraints will prevent agents to be borrowers at inﬁnity.
We remark that economies where physical endowments have no strictly positive lower bound are
included within the framework stated in this paper. Furthermore, although utilities are separable
in time and states of nature, hyperbolic discounting is also compatible with our assumptions. In
addition, when at each node of the economy there is only one asset to be traded, we can go further
and assure that borrowing constraints become non-binding.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3
we state our main result of equilibrium existence. Section 4 is devoted to discuss some particular
cases of our analysis. Finally, an Appendix includes the proof of the equilibrium existence result.
2. Model
We consider a discrete time economy with inﬁnite horizon. Let S denote the non-empty set of
states of nature. At each date, individuals have common information about the realization of the
uncertainty. Let Ft be the information available at date t ∈ {0,1,...}, which is given by a ﬁnite
partition of S. For simplicity, we assume that there is no loss of information along the event-tree,
i.e. Ft+1 is ﬁner than Ft, for each t ≥ 0. Moreover, no information is available at t = 0, i.e. F0 = S.
A pair ξ = (t,σ), where t ≥ 0 and σ ∈ Ft, is called a node of the economy. The date associated
to ξ is denoted by t(ξ). The set of all nodes, called the event-tree, is denoted by D. Given ξ = (t,σ)
and µ = (t0,σ0), we say that µ is a successor of ξ, and we write µ ≥ ξ, if t0 ≥ t and σ0 ⊂ σ. Let ξ+
be the set of immediate successors of ξ, that is, the set of nodes µ ≥ ξ, where t(µ) = t(ξ) + 1. The
(unique) predecessor of ξ is denoted by ξ− and ξ0 is the node at t = 0. Let D(ξ) := {µ ∈ D : µ ≥ ξ},
DT(ξ) := {µ ∈ D(ξ) : t(µ) ≤ T + t(ξ)} and DT(ξ) := {µ ∈ D(ξ) : t(µ) = T + t(ξ)}.
At each ξ ∈ D there is a ﬁnite ordered set, L, of perishable commodities that can be traded in
spot markets. Let p(ξ) = (pl(ξ);l ∈ L) ∈ RL
+ be the price system of goods at ξ. Also, the process of
commodity prices is denoted by p = (p(ξ);ξ ∈ D).
There is an ordered set J of long-lived real assets that can be negotiated in the economy. Each
asset j ∈ J is characterized by the node in which it is issued, ξj ∈ D, by the maximum number of
period in which it can be negotiated, Tj ∈ N∪{+∞}, and by (unitary) real payments, A(µ,j) ∈ RL
+,
where µ ∈ DTj(ξj) \ {ξj}. We assume that, for each j ∈ J, (A(µ,j),µ ∈ DTj(ξj) \ {ξj}) 6= 0. Thus,
by construction, we avoid ﬁat money in our economy.
At each node the number of issued asset is ﬁnite. Therefore, the set J(ξ) = {j ∈ J : (ξ ∈
DTj−1(ξj)) ∧ (∃µ > ξ,A(µ,j) 6= 0)}, formed by the assets that can be negotiated at ξ, is either
empty or ﬁnite. Note that if j ∈ J is an inﬁnite-lived asset, then for every T > 0, there exists
ξ ∈ DT(ξj) such that j ∈ J(ξ).INFINITE HORIZON ECONOMIES WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINTS 3
Let q(ξ) = (qj(ξ); j ∈ J(ξ)) be the vector of asset prices at ξ. Analogously, q = (q(ξ);ξ ∈ D)
denotes the process of asset prices in the economy. Deﬁne D(J) = {(ξ,j) ∈ D × J : j ∈ J(ξ)}.
A ﬁnite number of agents, h ∈ H, can trade securities and buy commodities at each node in the




+ , at each ξ ∈ D, and by her preferences on consumption, which are represented by an
utility function Uh : R
D×L
+ → R+ ∪ {+∞}.




j(µ) denotes the vector of aggregated ﬁnancial endowments
received by agent h up to node ξ, where eh
j(µ) is the quantity of asset j received by agent h at µ.
Essentially, we assume that assets’ net supply does not disappear or depreciate, before its terminal
nodes.
We denote by Wh(ξ) = wh(ξ) +
P
j∈J(ξ−) A(ξ,j)eh
j(ξ−) the agent h’s aggregated physical en-
dowments up to node ξ ∈ D, where A(ξ0,j) = 0, for each j ∈ J(ξ0). Also, we write W(ξ) =
P
h∈H Wh(ξ).





































0 )) = 0.
It follows that xh(ξ) = (xh
l (ξ);l ∈ L) is the consumption bundle of agent h at ξ. Analogously,
θh
j (ξ) and ϕh
j(ξ) denote, respectively, the quantity of asset j ∈ J(ξ) that agent h buy and sell at ξ.
It is important to remark that we introduce a borrowing constraint in order to prevent agents
from entering into Ponzi schemes. In fact, at each ξ ∈ D, agent h is restricted to choose a short-
position ϕh(ξ) in order to maintain an amount of borrowing which is less than or equal to a ﬁxed
proportion κ > 0 of her initial wealth.






(a) For each agent h ∈ H, (xh,θh,ϕh) ∈ argmax(x,θ,ϕ)∈Bh(p,q) Uh(x).















j(ξ), ∀j ∈ J(ξ).
3. Existence of Equilibrium
In this section we formalize our main results which assures that equilibrium exists in our economy.
For this, we state the following assumptions on endowments and preferences,
Assumption E1. For each (ξ,h) ∈ D × H, wh(ξ)  0.4 EMMA MORENO-GARC´ IA AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
Assumption E2. Assets have positive net supply. That is,
P
h∈H eh
j(ξj) > 0, ∀j ∈ J.
Assumption P1. For each h ∈ H, Uh(x) =
P
ξ∈D uh(ξ,x(ξ)), where uh(ξ,·) : RL
+ → R+ is
continuous, concave and strictly increasing. Moreover, Uh(W) < +∞.
Assumption P2. Let L(J) := {l ∈ L : ∃(µ,j) ∈ D × J, Al(µ,j) > 0} and deﬁne kxkL(J) =





Hypotheses E1 and P1, which require positivity of physical endowments and separability of
preferences, are commonly established in the related literature. The objective of Assumptions E2
and P2 is just to get bounds for equilibrium asset prices.
Precisely, we prove that, if inter-temporal utilities go to inﬁnity as consumption increases, assets
prices are bounded away from zero. Moreover, when assets have positive net supply, Assumption
P2 will allow us to assure that assets prices have an upper bound as well.
Note that, when we consider numeraire assets, P2 simply states that inter-temporal utilities go
to inﬁnity as the consumption of the commodity in which assets pay increases.
Theorem. Under Assumptions E1, E2, P1 and P2 our economy has an equilibrium.
We remark that impatience properties, as those imposed by Magill and Quinzii (1994, 1996) or
Hernandez and Santos (1996), are not required in this paper to prove equilibrium existence.1
Indeed, our ﬁnancial constraints allow us to establish a link between the asymptotic amount of
borrowing and the asymptotic value of initial endowments. Thus, to prove optimality of individual
allocations, that will be obtained as limit of optimal allocations in ﬁnite horizon economies, it is
enough to assure that the discounted value of individual wealth is ﬁnite (using as deﬂators the
cluster point of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers corresponding to ﬁnite horizon economies). This will
be the case, as it is proved in the Appendix (see discussion after Lemma A2).
In the other side, note that agents are not restricted to select bounded consumption plans.
However, if we suppose, as in Magill and Quinzii (1996), that consumers can only choose plans
xh = (xh(ξ);ξ ∈ D) in
l∞





then hypothesis P2 can be removed when both aggregated endowments are bounded and P1 is
strengthened by requiring also separability on the commodities in L(J). That is, we will require,
Assumption E3. W = (W(ξ);ξ ∈ D) ∈ l∞
+ (L × D).
1The impatience properties used in the literature are joint requirements in preferences and endowments (see, for
instance, Assumptions B2 and B4 in Magill and Quinzii (1996)). Therefore, although our utilities can be separable
with a constant inter-temporal factor (as in Assumption P4 below) if endowments are not uniformly bounded away
from zero then Magill and Quinzii’s impatience property is not necessarily satisﬁed.INFINITE HORIZON ECONOMIES WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINTS 5
Assumption P3. Given (ξ,l) ∈ D × L(J), there are functions vh(ξ,·) : R
L\L(J)
+ → R+ and
fh
l (ξ,·) : R+ → R+ such that,







l (ξ,xl), ∀h ∈ H, ∀x = (xl;l ∈ L) ∈ RL
+.
Corollary. Suppose that Assumptions E1-E3, P1 and P3 hold and that agents are restricted to
select bounded consumption plans. Then, there exists an equilibrium for our economy.
In particular, when there is only one commodity to be traded, E1-E3 and P1 are suﬃcient to
assure existence of equilibria.
4. Final Remarks
In this section we present comments which allow us thoroughly to provide subtle interpretations
and readings of our results. Consider the following hypotheses:
Assumption E4. ∃w ∈ RL
++ : wh(ξ) ≥ w, ∀(ξ,h) ∈ D × H.
Assumption E5. ∃ρ ∈ (0,1) such that, ρW(ξ) ≤ wh(ξ), ∀(ξ,h) ∈ D × H.




h ρh(ξ)uh(x(ξ)), where uh : RL
+ → R+ is a
continuous, concave and strictly increasing function. Moreover, βh ∈ (0,1), ρh(ξ0) = 1 and, for each
ξ ∈ D,
P
µ∈ξ+ ρh(µ) = ρh(ξ) > 0.
Bounded debts and non-binding borrowing constraints. Assume that Assumptions E1-E3, P2 and
P4 hold. Then, equilibrium exists and individual debts are uniformly bounded along the event-tree.














we have that, for any ξ ∈ D, the amount of debt q(ξ)(θh(ξ)−ϕh(ξ)) ≤
akp(ξ)kΣ, provided that q(ξ)(θh(ξ) − ϕh(ξ)) ≥ 0.2
Therefore, ﬁnancial market feasibility implies that, for each h ∈ H, we have that
−a(#H − 1)kp(ξ)kΣ ≤ q(ξ)(θh(ξ) − ϕh(ξ)) ≤ akp(ξ)kΣ.
In particular, when there is only one security to be negotiated, the uniform bound on debt above
induces an uniform bound on borrowing. Within this context, for proportions κ large enough, our
borrowing constraints are not binding at equilibrium.3




3Previously, Hernandez and Santos (1996) have shown equilibrium existence in an economy with debt constraints,
when only one inﬁnite-lived asset in positive net supply is traded. We assure more when agents are burden by
borrowing constraints, namely, restrictions on the amount of borrowing became non-binding.6 EMMA MORENO-GARC´ IA AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
Alternative borrowing constraints. Assume, as in Hernandez and Santos (1997), that E5 holds. Then
we can bound the growth of borrowing by requiring that, at each node ξ, q(ξ)ϕ(ξ) ≤ κp(ξ)W(ξ).
Thus, borrowing constraints may depends on the value of the aggregated amount of commodities.
Alternatively, the constraint q(ξ)ϕ(ξ) ≤ p(ξ)M, where M ∈ RL
+ \ {0}, can be implemented
provided that initial endowments, as in Magill and Quinzii (1996), satisfy Assumption E4.
Actually, in both cases the same technique of proof will operate: Under hypotheses E2, E4 (or
E5), P1 and P2, truncated economies will also have equilibrium, given that asset prices will be
bounded away from zero and from above, node by node. The main point is that transversality
condition will also hold (see equations (6), (7) and (8) in the Appendix).
Rational asset pricing bubbles. Suppose that hypotheses E1-E3, P2 and P4 hold. It follows from the
previous comments that, for the equilibrium allocation we construct, (i) marginal rates of substitu-
tion will be summable (see equation (8) below), and (ii) individual debt will be uniformly bounded
along the event-tree. In particular, as assets have positive net supply, their prices will be uniformly
bounded along the event-tree. Therefore, the discounted value of asset prices, using the marginal
rates of substitution as deﬂators, goes to zero as time goes to inﬁnity. That is, analogous to Magill
and Quinzii (1996), assets are free of bubbles.
Appendix
To prove our main result we show, ﬁrstly, that there exist equilibria in ﬁnite horizon truncated
economies. Then, an equilibrium for the original economy will be found as a limit of equilibria
corresponding to a sequence of truncated economies, when the time horizon increases.
Truncated economies. For each T ∈ N, we deﬁne a truncated economy, ET, in which agents
consume commodities and trade assets in the restricted event-tree DT(ξ0).
Let JT(ξ) = {j ∈ J(ξ) : ∃µ ∈ DT−t(ξ)(ξ), µ 6= ξ, A(µ,j) 6= 0} be the set of available securities at
ξ ∈ DT−1(ξ0). At each ξ ∈ DT(ξ0), we deﬁne JT(ξ) = ∅. It follows that, given ξ ∈ D, JT(ξ) = J(ξ)
for every T large enough. Let DT(J) = {(ξ,j) ∈ DT(ξ0) × J : j ∈ JT(ξ)}.
Each individual h ∈ H is characterized by her physical, (wh(ξ);ξ ∈ DT(ξ0)), and ﬁnancial,
(eh(ξ);ξ ∈ DT−1(ξ0)), endowments. Also, when agent h chooses a consumption plan (x(ξ))ξ∈DT(ξ0),
her utility is given by Uh,T(x) =
P
ξ∈DT(ξ0) uh(ξ,x(ξ)).
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where ∆L
+ := {p ∈ RL






    
    
y(ξ) = (x(ξ),θ(ξ),ϕ(ξ)) ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT(ξ0),
g
h,T
ξ (y(ξ),y(ξ−);p,q) ≤ 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT(ξ0),
q(ξ)ϕ(ξ) − κp(ξ)wh(ξ) ≤ 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT−1(ξ0),
(θ(ξ),ϕ(ξ)) = 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT(ξ0),
where y(ξ
−
0 ) = 0 and, for each ξ ∈ DT(ξ0),
g
h,T















(p(ξ)A(ξ,j) + qj(ξ))(θj(ξ−) − ϕj(ξ−)).
Let Bh,T(p,q) be the truncated budget set of agent h, i.e. the set of plans (y(ξ))ξ∈DT(ξ0) that satisfy
the restrictions of the problem Ph,T above.
Definition A1. An equilibrium for the economy ET is given by prices (pT,qT) ∈ PT and individual









+ , such that:
(1) For each h ∈ H, (yh,T(ξ))ξ∈DT(ξ0) is an optimal solution for Ph,T at prices (pT,qT);
(2) Physical and ﬁnancial markets clear at each ξ ∈ DT(ξ0).
Equilibrium existence in truncated economies. In order to show the existence of equilibria


















Let GT(X,Θ,Ψ,M) be a generalized game where each consumer is represented by a player h ∈ H
and, at each ξ ∈ DT(ξ0), there is also a player who behaves as an auctioneer.
More precisely, in GT(X,Θ,Ψ,M) each player h ∈ H behaves as price-taker and, given (p,q) ∈
PT
M, she chooses strategies in the truncated budget set Bh,T(p,q) ∩ K(X,Θ,Ψ) in order to max-
imize the function Uh,T. Also, at each ξ ∈ DT−1(ξ0) (resp. ξ ∈ DT(ξ0)) the corresponding
auctioneer chooses commodity and asset prices (p(ξ),q(ξ)) ∈ ∆L
+ × [0,Mξ] (resp. just commod-
ity prices p(ξ) ∈ ∆L





yh = (yh(ξ))ξ∈DT(ξ0) are the strategies selected by player h ∈ H.







is a Nash equilibrium for GT(X,Θ,Ψ,M) if each player maximizes her objective function, given the
strategies chosen by the other players, i.e. no player has an incentive to deviate.8 EMMA MORENO-GARC´ IA AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
Lemma A1. Let T ∈ N and (X,Θ,Ψ,M) ∈ FT. Under Assumptions E1 and P1 the set of Nash
equilibria for the game GT(X,Θ,Ψ,M) is non-empty.
Proof. Note that each player’s strategy set is non-empty, convex and compact. Further, it follows
from Assumption P1 that the objective function of each player is continuous and quasi-concave
in her own strategy. Assumption E2 assures that the correspondences of admissible strategies are
continuous, with non-empty, convex and compact values. Therefore, we can ﬁnd an equilibrium of
the generalized game by applying Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem to the correspondence deﬁned as
the product of the optimal strategy correspondences. 
Lemma A2. Let T ∈ N. Under Assumptions E1, E2, P1 and P2, there exists (ΘT,ΨT) such that,
if (Θ,Ψ)  (ΘT,ΨT), then every Nash equilibrium of the game GT(X,Θ,Ψ,M) is an equilibrium





ξ∈DT(ξ0) be a Nash equilibrium for GT(X,Θ,Ψ,M), with
allocations given by yh,T(ξ) = (xh,T(ξ),θh,T(ξ),ϕh,T(ξ)). Note that, for each h ∈ H,
(yh,T(ξ))ξ∈DT(ξ0) ∈ argmaxBh,T(pT,qT)∩K(X,Θ,Ψ) Uh,T(x).
Then, as each auctioneer maximizes his objective function, we have that, at each ξ ∈ DT(ξ0),
X
h∈H










It follows from Assumptions P1 and P2 that, for each ξ ∈ DT(ξ0), there exists a real number
aT











where ΥT(Θ) := (ΥT(Θ,ξ);ξ ∈ DT(ξ0)).
Suppose that X(ξ,l) > aT
Θ(ξ), for every (ξ,l) ∈ DT(ξ0) × L. As kpT(ξ)kΣ = 1, it follows
from individual optimality that the value of accumulated individual ﬁnancial endowments, at any
ξ ∈ DT(ξ0), is necessarily less than pT(ξ)(aT
Θ(ξ),...,aT
Θ(ξ)) = aT
Θ(ξ). Therefore, for each j ∈ JT(ξ),
qT










Θ(ξ,j);(ξ,j) ∈ DT(J)). We conclude that if M  MT
Θ, then in any Nash equi-
librium of GT(X,Θ,Ψ,M) the upper bounds of asset prices, which were previously imposed, are
non-binding. Along the rest of this proof we assume that this property holds.














Summing up the budget constraints at ξ0 we have pT(ξ0)Γ(ξ0) + qT(ξ0)Ω(ξ0) ≤ 0. Since the
auctioneer at ξ0 maximizes p(ξ0)Γ(ξ0) + q(ξ0)Ω(ξ0), we obtain that Γ(ξ0) ≤ 0. Assume now thatINFINITE HORIZON ECONOMIES WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINTS 9
Ω(ξ0,j) > 0, for some j ∈ JT(ξ0). By the construction of the plan M, we know that qT
j (ξ0) < Mξ0,j,
which leads us to obtain a contradiction with the optimal behaviour of the auctioneer at ξ0. Thus
Ω(ξ0) ≤ 0. Hence, if X(ξ0,l) > max{W(ξ0,l),aT
Θ(ξ0)} for each l ∈ L, then the upper bound on
consumption is not binding at ξ0, allowing us to conclude, as a consequence of the monotonicity
of preferences, that commodity markets clear at the initial node ξ0, i.e. Γ(ξ0) = 0. Moreover,
qT(ξ0)Ω(ξ0) = 0.
Consider now a node ξ with t(ξ) = 1, and recall that the corresponding auctioneer at ξ chooses
prices in ∆L





the fact that Ω(ξ0) ≤ 0, we can deduce that pT(ξ)Γ(ξ) + qT(ξ)Ω(ξ) ≤ 0, for every ξ with t(ξ) = 1.
As before, Γ(ξ) ≤ 0 and Ω(ξ) ≤ 0. Furthermore, if X(ξ) > max{W(ξ,l),aT
Θ(ξ)} for every l ∈ L,
then the upper bound on consumption is not binding at ξ, which implies that Γ(ξ) = 0.
By applying successively analogous arguments to the nodes with periods t = 2,...,T, we conclude
that Γ(ξ) = 0 for every ξ ∈ DT(ξ0), provided that, for each l ∈ L, X(ξ,l) > max{W(ξ,l), aT
Θ(ξ)}.
That is, physical markets clear in the economy ET. Furthermore, there is no excess of demand for
ﬁnancial markets, i.e. Ω(ξ) ≤ 0, for every ξ ∈ DT−1(ξ0).
Step 2. Lower bounds of asset prices. Given (ξ,j) ∈ DT(J), ﬁx a node µ(ξ,j) that belongs to the
non-empty set argmin{t(µ) : µ ∈ DT−t(ξ)(ξ), µ 6= ξ, A(µ,j) 6= 0}.
By Assumptions E1, P1 and P2, there exists b(ξ,j) ∈ (0,1), independent of T, such that, for
















and for every µ ∈ DT−t(ξ)(ξ) with j ∈ JT(µ),
min
l∈L












We claim that qT
j (ξ) > b(ξ,j). In fact, if qT
j (ξ) ≤ b(ξ,j) then, as by Step 1 xh,T(µ) ≤ W(µ) for
every µ ∈ DT(ξ0), it follows from Assumption P1 and equation (1) that any agent h ∈ H has an







xh(µ) = wh(µ) + A(µ,j)θh
j (ξ), if µ = µ(ξ,j).
Therefore, if for each η ∈ DT(ξ0),
Θ(η,j) > b Θ(η,j), ∀j ∈ JT(η),
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then equilibrium asset prices have a positive lower bound away from zero. In fact, for each
(η,j) ∈ DT(J), we have that qT
j (η) > b(η,j).
Step 3. Non-binding short-sales constraints. Deﬁne b ΘT = (b Θ(η,j);(η,j) ∈ DT(J)) and X T
Θ =
(X T
Θ(η);η ∈ DT(ξ0)). If Θ  b ΘT and X  X T
Θ, asset prices are bounded away from zero. Thus,
using the borrowing constraints, we conclude that, for every player h ∈ H,
ϕ
h,T




, ∀(ξ,j) ∈ DT(J).
Let ΨT = (b Ψj(ξ);(ξ,j) ∈ DT(J)). If Ψ  ΨT then short-sales restrictions induced by K(X,Θ,Ψ,M)
are not binding.
Step 4. Financial markets clear and upper bounds for long-positions are non-binding. Suppose that
(Θ,Ψ)  (b ΘT,ΨT) and X  X T
Θ. Now, by Step 1 we have that qT(ξ)Ω(ξ) = 0 and Ω(ξ) ≤ 0,
for each ξ ∈ DT−1(ξ0). Thus, if for some (ξ,j) ∈ DT(J), Ωj(ξ) < 0, then qT
j (ξ) = 0, which is in
contradiction with the lower bound on asset prices ﬁnd in Step 2.
On the other hand, for each ξ ∈ DT−1(ξ0), (ϕh,T(ξ))h∈H is bounded. Thus, as Ω(ξ) ≤ 0,
P
h∈H θh,T(ξ) is also bounded. We conclude that there exists ΘT ≥ b ΘT such that, if Θ  ΘT then
upper bounds on long positions are non-binding.
Step 5. Individual optimality. As a consequence of all previous steps, if (Θ,Ψ)  (ΘT,ΨT) and
(X,M)  (X T
Θ,MT
Θ) then, for each h ∈ H, the optimal allocation yh,T belongs to the interior of






Therefore, any Nash equilibrium of GT(X,Θ,Ψ,M) is an equilibrium of ET, provided that
(Θ,Ψ)  (ΘT,ΨT) and (X,M)  (X T
Θ,MT
Θ). 
Recall that, given ξ ∈ D, JT(ξ) = J(ξ) for T large enough. Thus, by construction, the upper
bounds (ΘT(ξ),ΨT(ξ)) are independent of T > t(ξ), when T is large enough. Therefore, node by
node, independently of the truncated horizon T, individual equilibrium allocations are uniformly
bounded and commodity prices belong to the simplex.
Moreover, under Assumptions E2, P1 and P2, asset prices are uniformly bounded by above, node
by node. In fact, as consumption allocations are bounded by the aggregated resources, by analogous







, ∀j ∈ JT(ξ),
where a(ξ) > 0 is independent of T > t(ξ) and is deﬁned implicitly by
min
h∈H
uh (ξ,(a(ξ),...,a(ξ))) > max
h∈H
Uh(W).INFINITE HORIZON ECONOMIES WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINTS 11
Asymptotic equilibria. In order to ﬁnd an equilibrium of our original economy, we look for
an uniform bound (node by node) for the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated to the truncated
individual problems.

























= 0, ∀ξ ∈ DT−1(ξ0). (3)
Moreover, for each plan (x(ξ),θ(ξ),ϕ(ξ))ξ∈DT(ξ0) ≥ 0, with (θ(η),ϕ(η))η∈DT(ξ0) = 0, the following




































≤ Uh(W) < +∞.















where, by Assumption E1, wh
ξ := minl∈L wh
l (ξ) > 0.
In short, for each ξ ∈ D, the sequence formed by equilibrium prices, equilibrium allocations




ξ )h∈H)T>t(ξ), is bounded. Applying


















ξ∈D ∈ Bh(p,q). As limit allocations are cluster points, node





ξ∈D is an equilibrium it remains to show that, for each agent
h ∈ H, (yh(ξ))ξ∈D is an optimal choice when prices are (p,q).
Lemma A3. Under Assumptions E1, E2, P1 and P2, Uh(˜ x) ≤ Uh(x), for every ˜ y := (˜ x, ˜ θ, ˜ ϕ) ∈
Bh(p,q).
Proof. Fix a node ξ ∈ D. Let us take T > t(ξ) large enough, to assure that JT(µ) = J(µ) for
each µ ≤ ξ and consider the allocation,
(x(µ),θ(µ),ϕ(µ)) =
(
(xh,T(µ),θh,T(µ),ϕh,T(µ)), if µ 6= ξ,
(˜ x(ξ), ˜ θ(ξ), ˜ ϕ(ξ)), if µ = ξ.12 EMMA MORENO-GARC´ IA AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MART´ INEZ
Then, it follows from inequality (4) that, under Assumption P1,














µ(yh,T(µ), ˜ y(ξ); pT,qT),
where gh
ξ ≤ 0 denotes the budget constraint at ξ ∈ D. As ˜ y is budget feasible at prices (p,q), taking
the limit as T = Tk goes to inﬁnity, we obtain that,
uh(ξ, ˜ x(ξ)) − uh(ξ,x(ξ)) ≤ γh
ξgh





µ(yh(µ), ˜ y(ξ); p,q).
As ˜ y and (yh(ξ))ξ∈D belongs to Bh(p,q), adding previous inequality over the nodes in DN(ξ0), with
N ∈ N, it follows that,





µ(yh(µ), ˜ y(µ−); p,q).
Thus, as ˜ y is budget feasible, borrowing constraints imply that,








(µ) − ϕh(ξ)) + κp(µ)wh(µ)

.
In the other side, deﬁne L
h,T
ξ = pT(ξ)xh,T(ξ)+qT(ξ)(θh,T(ξ)−ϕh,T(ξ)). Consider the allocation,
(x(µ),θ(µ),ϕ(µ)) =
(
(xh,T(µ),θh,T(µ),ϕh,T(µ)), if µ 6= ξ ,
(0,0,0), if µ = ξ.















ξ ≤ uh(ξ,xh,T(ξ)), ∀ξ ∈ DT(ξ0).










uh(µ,W(µ)), ∀T > N + 1.














Thus, it follows from inequality (6) that,














Therefore, it follows from Assumption P1 that: For each ε > 0 there exists Nε > 0 such that,
X
ξ∈DN(ξ0)
uh(ξ, ˜ x(ξ)) < ε + Uh(x), ∀N > NεINFINITE HORIZON ECONOMIES WITH BORROWING CONSTRAINTS 13
Finally, we conclude that, for each ε > 0, Uh(˜ x) ≤ ε + Uh(x), which ends the proof. 
Proof of the Corollary. Given (ξ,h) ∈ D × H, deﬁne








l (ξ,min{xl,2Wl(ξ)}) + ρ(ξ,l)max{xl − 2Wl(ξ),0}

,
where x = (xl;l ∈ L) ∈ RL
+ and ρ(ξ,l) ∈ ∂fh
l (ξ,2Wl(ξ)).4 It follows from the separability of the










being yh(ξ) = (xh(ξ),θ
h
(ξ),ϕh(ξ)), for the economy in which each h ∈ H has preferences represented
by the function ˜ Uh instead of Uh. Moreover, this equilibrium is an equilibrium for the original
economy. In fact, since agents are restricted to choose bounded consumption plans, if there exists
a budget feasible allocation (xh,θh,ϕh) such that Uh(xh) > Uh(xh) then there is λ ∈ (0,1) such
that, the consumption plan x(λ) := λxh + (1 − λ)xh, with x(λ) = (xl(λ,ξ);ξ ∈ D), satisﬁes
xl(λ,ξ) < 2Wl(ξ), ∀l ∈ L(J). Thus,
˜ Uh(x(λ)) = Uh(x(λ)) > λUh(xh) + (1 − λ)Uh(xh) > Uh(xh) = ˜ Uh(xh),
which is a contradiction. 
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